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Rebels with a Cause, Folk Devils without 
a Panic: Press jingoism, policing tactics 
and anti-capitalist protest in London and 
Prague 
 
Fiona Donson, Graeme Chesters, Ian Welsh and Andrew Tickle1 
 
“Their aim is clear. They want a violent and bloody conflagration on the streets. They 
want to … cause anarchy.”  (The Daily Telegraph 18.02.01) 
Abstract 
This paper examines whether anti-capitalist political activists are (mis)constructed as 
‘folk devils’, through an examination of media coverage in the UK and Czech Republic. 
The construction, of such protestors, as violent criminals and dangerous ‘anarchists’ 
has, it is argued, influenced their treatment at protests by public authorities in London 
and Prague. The paper also offers, in juxtaposition to this representation of the current 
anti-capitalism movement, a discussion of the accounts of activists themselves. In 
particular it examines the activists’ own perceptions of their engagement in the global 
social movement against capitalism. The paper is based on evidence drawn from the 
preliminary findings of interdisciplinary research into global social movements, and in 
particular the protests against the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in 
Prague in September 20001. 
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Introduction 
This paper argues that we are currently witnessing the development of a new type of folk 
devil thus engaging with Martin’s (2002) call for the consideration of social movements 
to include notions of culture, subcultures and deviance. This claim is advanced through a 
consideration of the construction of the protest activities of social movement activists and 
other citizens associated with the anti-capitalist movement as a deviant group and the 
consequences which flow from that construction. We argue that, in the context of such 
activism, the idea of the folk devil has been significantly altered from the traditional 
understanding that sits alongside the criminological account of moral panics. The paper 
examines the way in which anti-capitalist activists are constructed as a new class of folk 
devil through the media portrayal of protests and the associated political and expert 
comment. In this process prominent politicians and senior police officers identify 
activists as ‘violent’, ‘mindless thugs’2, views widely reproduced in print and broadcast 
media. The reasons for, and results of, this construction are varied but it is argued that 
primary amongst these is the ability to trivialise and dismiss activists through a rejection 
of their behaviour as simply destructive and dangerous. This then facilitates a silencing of 
these alternative voices in terms of both wider debates on the pros and cons of citizens 
rights to protest within neo-liberal capitalist democracy and wider contested issues of 
social and economic justice.  
 
After outlining these significant shifts in the contemporary anatomy of the ‘folk devil’ 
and the importance of ‘moral panics’, the paper moves on to briefly considers how the 
participants in these actions understand their own involvement in the protests. Activists’ 
engagement in, and understanding of, their actions allows them to construct their own 
complex knowledge of their participation in political action, as well as offering the 
potential for some to engage in a process of ‘feedback’ that is disruptive of folk devil 
imagery and ideas. 
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The traditional account of folk devils and moral panics 
The classical criminological account uses the notion of ‘deviance amplification’ (Wilkins 
1964) to approach the folk devil as a class of people or group that become constructed, as 
‘the personification of evil’ (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994) within society. Once a group 
is successfully identified as a folk devil the associated identity dominates the public 
sphere producing a primary focus on negative characteristic through media coverage and 
expert commentary (Cohen 1972). 
 
The result is that someone falling within the folk devil category is understood to have 
few redeeming characteristics - their identity is fixed in clear and simplistic terms. As 
Goode and Ben-Yehuda state: 
Once a category has been identified in the media as consisting of 
troublemakers, the supposed havoc-wrecking behaviour of its members 
reported to the public, and their supposed stereotypical features litanized, 
the process of creating the folk devil is complete; from then on all 
mention of representatives of the new category revolves around their 
central, and exclusively negative features. (1994:29)  
 
The folk devil is considered as ‘evil’ and deviant. Their behaviour is harmful to the social 
order and understood simply as being criminal and/or destructive to the interests of 
society. They are therefore selfish and dangerous, engaging in actions that do not require 
any deeper understanding merely the application of appropriate sanctions. As a result, 
society becomes interested merely in preventing them engaging in their dangerous 
behaviour. The forces of the state can then be mobilised to stop them – through 
institutional responses such as enacting legislation, strong-arm policing tactics and 
prosecution.  
 
The construction of ‘folk devils’ in one dimensional terms such as  ‘harmful’ and ‘evil’ 
effectively precludes more complex explanations of the actions and behaviour of those 
involved by defining them as ‘outsiders’ to the established, ordered social system.  They 
cannot then be understood as potentially or actually accepted or respectable members of 
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society. In the context of the construction of political activists as folk devils this has a 
particularly significant effect, which we explore below. 
 
Mainstream media constructions 
The mainstream mass media often plays a key role in establishing a group as devils. 
News stories are often led by press releases issued by governments and police forces in a 
manner which sets the media agenda, particularly where the folk devil is either a person 
or group that challenges perceptions of the established order of society. The mass media 
frequently reports on events and behaviour, in a way that, arguably, initiates, reinforces 
and embeds large sections of the general public’s suspicions and fears (Chomsky and 
Herman, 1988). Arguably, media concerns with circulation figures and market share 
reinforces this state centric tendency to portray folk devils through stories that shock and 
engage the public. Cohen’s (1972) classic account of moral panics and folk devils points 
out the media have particular views about which stories can be understood as being 
newsworthy: 
‘It is not that instruction manuals exist telling newsmen that certain 
subjects (drugs, sex, violence) will appeal to the public or that certain 
groups (youths, immigrants) should be continually exposed to scrutiny. 
Rather, there are built-in factors, ranging from the individual newsman’s 
intuitive hunch about what constitutes a ‘good story’, through precepts 
such as ‘give the public what it wants’ to structured ideological biases, 
which predispose the media to make certain events into news.’ (1972:45) 
 
Evaluating the role of the media in this context, Cohen identifies three central elements - 
exaggeration, prediction and symbolisation. Thus, events are distorted when exaggerated 
i.e. in terms of the numbers who take  part in the event and the type of damage or 
violence that occurs. This is emphasised further by the type of language used in reporting 
the incidents - thus words such as ‘riot’, ‘siege’ and ‘orgy of destruction’ were frequently 
used in the reporting of events surrounding clashes between Mods and Rockers in the 
English seaside resort of Clacton in the 1960’s. The media also predict that the initial 
incident will be followed by more events that become yet more violent and destructive. 
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The final part of the process involves symbolic interpretation, which sees basic symbols 
turned into negative indicators of deviancy: 
‘There appear to be three processes in such symbolization: a word (Mod) 
becomes symbolic of a certain status (delinquent or deviant); objects 
(hairstyles, clothing) symbolize the word; the objects themselves become 
symbolic of the status (and the emotions attached to the status).’ (Cohen, 
1972:134) 
So the media have a strong tendency to report those stories they regard as being 
‘newsworthy’, in a way that simplifies the events by focussing on the more sensational 
and negative aspects. This approach to reporting intensifies as the folk devil persona 
develops, precluding more sophisticated in depth coverage. The inclusion of elite expert 
voices offering informed commentary can compound such simplification, or even 
amplify it in, the absence of voices from within the ranks of those identified as folk 
devils. Such amplification is particularly notable when the experts concerned originate 
within institutions associated with the generation of official press releases and policy 
documents.  
 
When media coverage and expert interpretation develop in ways that create a widespread 
sense of fear in society, or a key constituency within it, this fuels expectations that firm 
action will be taken against the folk devil. Clearly, where folk devil behaviour is 
identified as criminal a strong state response appears necessary and as a result public 
opinion may be manoeuvred into a position tolerant of measures inimical to wider rights 
and freedoms.  The emphasis of the state is limited to stopping the problem, not resolving 
deeper issues of interests and rights (Donson 2000). 
 
The identification of a group as folk devils offers an opportunity for vested interests to 
engage in ‘ideological exploitation’ (Thompson 1998:39) within which the exploiter 
‘gains’ from their ability to denounce the folk devil via a particular type of deviance. 
Such gains can be both abstract political goals and more immediate practical 
considerations including more resources and greater powers for the police, increased 
newspaper sales, and the reinforcement of normative concepts of authority and discipline 
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that favour elected politicians. For example, Amanda Webster, Deputy Sherrif of 
Lancashire, stated that .because direct action has increased: ‘…so the will to stamp out 
extreme protest has intensified’, producing an ‘effective lobby . . . to curb the 
Movement’. The inclusion of animal rights and similar protests within the Terrorism Act 
2000 was part of a ‘backlash against extreme protest’ adding that ‘Similar draconian 
legislation will not be far behind’ (Webster 2002). 
 
Moral Panics 
When considering the contexts within which previous analysis of the moral panic/folk 
devil construction has been undertaken it becomes apparent that we may be dealing with 
a different type of constructed deviance in this study. Traditionally, criminological and 
sociological discussion of the folk devil relates to the construction of deviancy 
(McRobbie 1994) within the context of an associated moral panic. Yet the very idea of a 
moral panic has some important elements that are significant for analysis of the 
construction of politically engaged activists as deviants.  
 
Since Cohen’s initial (1972) formulation, the moral panic has centred upon political 
issues that have at their core a strong moral dimension conducive to heated debate around 
acceptable behaviour within society. The danger threatens something that is fundamental 
to society and therefore poses a serious threat to the very order of things. Thus, we find 
moral panics arising in relation to, members of ethnic minorities (Hall et.al. 1978) , drug 
use, raves, single mothers, dangerous dogs (Thompson 1998), and ‘out of control youths’ 
(McKay 1998).  
 
The classic construction of the moral panic (Cohen 1972), was thus underpinned by a 
politics of anxiety theory. This approach understands a panic as serving to reassert the 
dominance of an established value system, particularly at a time of perceived anxiety and 
crisis. In this way, the folk devil provides a necessary external threat which the majority 
can rally against. The typical folk devil is therefore someone on the edge of or even 
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outside of society – for example teenage single mothers, travellers or asylum seekers. 
These people do not have a voice; they are already effectively silent within civil society 
and are therefore an easy target for demonization. 
 
Our discussion of anti-capitalist activists argues that this traditional model of 
demonization needs to be amended in the light of new approaches and responses to the 
normative construction of the folk devil. Here we argue that the groups being constructed 
as folk devils are socially diverse, do not uniformly occupy marginal or external social 
positions and possess significant means of communication. Further, we ask why this 
contemporary folk devil has emerged in the absence of a clearly articulated moral panic? 
Our answer includes the socially diverse nature of the anti-capitalist movement and 
expressions of wider public ambivalence towards the demonization of activists 
confronting elements of neo-liberalism.  
 
Whilst Cohen’s (1972) arguments were underpinned by the notion of a crisis emerging 
from post-war tensions within society resulting in ‘ritualistic confrontation’ (Thompson 
1998:40) between the forces of order and morality on the one hand and the deviants on 
the other the contemporary milieu confronts crises of globalization.  Like the Mods and 
Rockers of England’s 1960’s, today’s targets for demonization are not exactly the usual 
‘outsiders’ having a degree of  affluence but a culture amounting to a rejection of 
traditional values expressed through  behaviour, fashion and music. The threat does not 
come from their outsider status but from the fact that they challenge accepted norms from 
within. 
As Angela McRobbie (1994) succinctly points out: 
‘… at root the moral panic is about instilling fear in people and, in so 
doing, encouraging them to try to turn away from the complexity and the 
visible social problems of everyday life and either to retreat into a 
‘fortress mentality’ – a feeling of hopelessness, political powerlessness 
and paralysis – or to adopt a gung-ho ‘something must be done about it’ 
attitude.’ (McRobbie, 1994:199) 
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As we demonstrate below, similar effects are working within the construction of anti-
capitalist activists as folk devils. Here we develop McRobbie’s insight that the traditional 
approach is outdated – in particular because it relies on a rather old fashioned conception 
of the media associated with the hyper-dermic model. The complex inter-relationships 
between the different elements of society that operate in relation to the portrayal of a 
group as folk devil cannot be understated.  In an era of highly differentiated media niches 
government and police, reporter, editors and the folk devils themselves all play complex 
roles in the development of public perceptions of such a group. We pursue our account of 
the panic free new folk devil through a consideration of the image of anti-capitalist 
protesters constructed by the UK and Czech print media, contrasting this with elements 
of the classic folk devil case.  
 
Anti-capitalist activists as folk devils 
The core of this section revolves around two short case studies that arise out of actions in 
London on May Day 2000 and May Day 2001 and the Prague protests against the IMF 
and World Bank on September 26th, 2000. Whilst these case studies provide useful 
examples of the media coverage and political commentary demonstrating how activists 
are portrayed as incoherent, chaotic and dangerous they require some brief 
contextualisation. 
In the UK, engagement with anti-capitalist protests post 1999 needs to be understood 
within the context of the foregoing decades during which sections of the UK media 
denounced environmental activists amidst the vilification of the rave culture - associated 
with illegal drug use and unlicensed dance events contributing to a moral panic response 
in the late 1980s (McKay 1998, Redhead 1993, Thompson 1998, Chp. 3, Welsh 2000 
Chp.6). The free party/festival culture can easily be confused by the mainstream mass 
media and general public as something associated with illegal raves. Yet the free 
party/festival culture has long standing connections with environmental activism (McKay 
1996, 1998) blurring the boundaries between cultural movements and engaged political 
activism. There are also connections between these activists and new age travellers, a 
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group who has become part of the folk devil group that has for centuries operated around 
Gypsy communities (Morris 2000).  
The apparent ease with which many modern-day activists are now publicly connected 
with extreme violence and criminality is illustrated by the ritualised May Day protest 
actions in London. Our discussion illustrates police expectations of anti-capitalist 
activists’ behaviour, foregrounded violence, and criminal intent. Such fear is amplified 
by politicians and reproduced in the media, facilitating the creation of an environment 
conducive to suspicion and fear in the mind of the public. Trouble and violence thus 
become pre-event expectations associated with the anticipated presence of so-called 'rent-
a-mob' groups and the necessary use of strong policing tactics. It is assumed therefore 
that the public will be relieved that a robust response has been developed to prevent such 
criminals ‘causing serious harm’ to economic/political and social interests.  
 
Arguably, the authority’s supposition that the public supports. firm policing serves to 
insulate both police and political authorities from any charges of heavy handedness in 
resultant media portrayals of protest events. If tough policing measures are taken, and the 
‘event’ is kept ‘under control’, then the warnings from the authorities will be seen to have 
been vindicated and the strong policing strategy justified. If the policing strategy is not 
successful and violence occurs, then that allows for an even more robust response on 
future occasions. 
 
Legislative responses to the growth of protest movements in the UK have included the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 which defined new trespassory offences 
aimed at anti-roads protests and hunt saboteurs.3 The Terrorism Act 2000 and the 
‘research’ undertaken in the development of that legislation also illustrate the potential of 
demonization. The Consultation Paper (CM 4178, 1998) on Terrorism Legislation raised 
the prospect that environmental activists might, at some future point, change their 
activities and take on the more serious and dangerous actions of ‘terrorism’. However, 
since no evidence was offered in support of this position, it remained speculative, thus 
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creating an elision and effectively blurring the boundary between activist and terrorist 
within the new Act.4 In terms of the wider public sphere it also becomes part of the 
language used by politicians, police and the media to describe direct action. In this way, 
the inclusion of largely peaceful actions in the definition of terrorism is now  normal and 
allows authorities to justify the development and implementation of extreme legal and 
policing powers (Gearty 1999). The subsequent ‘war on terrorism’ has led to an 
extension of these ‘terrorist’ tropes, which are increasingly used as a mechanism  to 
secure the hegemonic position of particular political and economic interests, whilst 
silencing alternative perspectives. The construction of activists as folk devils and the 
deployment of terrorist tropes effectively silence their voices.  
 
Folk Devils without a Panic 
Traditionally this silencing process is part of the establishments’ capacity to manage and 
control political debate and shape public expectations (Middlemass 1979), something 
made increasingly difficult by modern media technologies (Thompson 1995) where 
alternative views and accounts can be published on the Internet.  Generally though, 
attempts by activists to gain mainstream media coverage for systematic debate on 
contested issues such as social justice, rights of assembly and freedom of speech is 
foreclosed by their ‘deviant’ construction. Politicians also attempt to trivialise any such 
claims as naïve, irrational, dangerous, un-democratic, self-interested etc.  
 
The silencing of anti-capitalist activists effectively blocks public engagement with the 
contemporary equivalent of the ‘crisis’ identified by Cohen (1972) but extends 
significantly to include a crisis of public trust in political process and institutions. 
However, there is no moral panic in relation to this new category of folk devil. There has 
been no widespread debate on the concerns underpinning activists’ behaviour because to 
do so would raise issues of trust in the context of alternatives threatening to established 
political systems. It is ironic, therefore, that there cannot be a moral panic in relation to 
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these folk devils without evoking a wider debate on interest representation within 
representative democracies.  
The process of silencing and demonization is ultimately underpinned by anonymising 
constituent individuals and reducing their identities as the ‘mob’. This is an historically 
persistent process within which sophisticated grievances and proactive stances in relation 
to social, economic and political innovation are dismissed through active association with 
violence in the wider public mind (Thompson 1978 esp. 66-73).  The possibility that 
activists may be respectable employed, thoughtful and committed to positive change 
within society is not widely engaged As the following discussion of the events 
surrounding the May Day 2000 and 2001 demonstrations in London will show, when the 
veil created by the folk devil construction is lifted, the reality can be seen to be 
something significantly different from that suggested by political spin and associated 
mainstream  media coverage.  
 
Creating ‘new’ folk devils - May Day 2000 and 2001 
On May Day 2000, a celebratory protest was organised in Parliament Square in 
London. The key part of the day was a ‘guerrilla gardening’ action intended to 
create an urban garden in front of the Houses of Parliament. The largely peaceful 
demonstration degenerated with limited violence and property damage after 
police allowed protestors to leave Parliament Square and enter Whitehall. Some 
shops, including a McDonalds, were damaged and, more controversially the 
Cenotaph and a memorial statute to Winston Churchill were defaced. There were 
30 arrests on the day and five people were reported to have been injured. Despite 
this limited level of injury and the small number of arrests that were made, the 
events of the day rapidly became labelled as  being a ‘riot’.   
 
These events dominated the front pages of following days’ press. Headlines included 
‘Anarchy thugs riot in central London’  (The Times, 02.05.00), ‘Rioters dishonour war 
heroes’ (The Daily Telegraph, 02.05.00), ‘Protests erupt in violence’, (The Guardian), 
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‘May Day Mayhem’ (Daily Express), ‘Riot Yobs desecrate Churchill Monument’ (The 
Sun). The UK Prime Minister Tony Blair reportedly described the protesters as being 
‘beneath contempt’ saying: 
‘The people responsible for the damage caused in London today are an 
absolute disgrace. Their actions have got nothing to do with convictions 
or beliefs and everything to do with mindless thuggery.’ The Guardian, 
2.05.00. 
The UK Home Secretary, Jack Straw, was keen to draw a distinction between ‘legitimate’ 
protest and criminal action by saying that the demonstration was ‘criminality and 
thuggery masquerading as political protest’ The Guardian 2.05.00. However, this 
simplification hides the reality of the complex nature of the whole protest and as the 
events of May Day 2000 began to be unpicked in the days that followed these incidents it 
became apparent that a construction of all the activists as ‘mindless thugs’ masks a more 
interesting and reflexive process. 
 
On May 2nd 2000, The Daily Mail printed pictures of protesters under the title ‘Do you 
recognise any of the rioters?’. The following day The Independent, led with ‘PM asks 
families to name May Day rioters’. The accompanying article reproduced Tony Blair’s 
expression of  ‘contempt for the rioters’ whilst Jack Straw’s5 comments elided 
‘criminality’, ‘thuggery’ and  political protest’ (The Independent 3.05.00,p.1). 
The protestor photographed spray painting Churchill’s statue gave himself up in the 
midst of a nationwide police hunt for more than 200 people. However, far from being a 
‘mindless thug’ the protestor in question was a 25 year old former soldier who had seen 
active service in Bosnia. As The Guardian pointed out that he did not fit the stereotype of 
a protester or eco-warrior, views strengthened when he appeared in court. It emerged that 
the protester had a justification for his ‘mindless’ act of vandalism which he set out as 
follows:  
‘The May Day celebrations were in the spirit of free expression against 
capitalism. Churchill was an exponent of capitalism and of imperialism 
and anti-Semitism. A Tory reactionary vehemently opposed to the 
emancipation of women and to independence in India. The media machine 
made this paunchy little man much larger than life – a colossal, towering 
figure of great stature and bearing with trademark cigar, bowler hat and 
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V-sign. The reality was an often irrational, sometimes vainglorious leader 
whose impetuosity, egotism and bigotry on occasion cost many lives 
unnecessarily and caused much suffering that was needless and 
unjustified.’ The Guardian, 8.05.00 
 
When the stipendiary magistrate asked what he had wanted to achieve by his actions he 
replied, ‘I thought that on a day when people all over the world are gathering to express 
basic human rights and freedom of expression it was acceptable to challenge an icon of 
the British establishment.’ (The Guardian 10.05.00). However, despite this claim to free 
expression the court sentenced him to 30 days’ imprisonment and a fine to compensate 
for the damage he had caused. An ex-soldier admitting to vandalising the statue of a 
figure of the British establishment is quite clearly a challenge to the mindless folk devil 
portrayed in the British news media. Someone with a sophisticated understanding of the 
role of political leaders in fostering inequalities in the world cannot be easily dismissed 
as the stereotypic thug of media portrayals. 
 
Other individuals prominent in the protests also confounded simplifying folk devil 
epithets as The Sun headline of May 4th declared ‘Eton Boy is Riot Thug’ describing the 
University Professor’s son as a ‘Self styled Anarchist’ who had apparently thrown  a 
plastic bottle at the police.  (The Sun, 04.05.00, p.1 & 5). Simultaneously The Daily 
Telegraph reported that from the initial 13 people appearing in court, eight ‘were born 
overseas, others were unemployed and one was a Kurdish refugee (4.05.00).  
 
The initial dominance of images and labels of mindless violence precluded any serious 
attention to the underlying moral, political or ethical concerns of participants in the event 
whilst the subsequent focus on a notable individual such as the Eton school boy arguably 
trivialised the event. Despite the condemnation of politicians we have noted, the majority 
of the events that took place in London on May Day 2000 were in fact peaceful, resulting 
in no violence or serious damage. The guerrilla gardening event, which had been the 
main element of the day’s action, passed off peacefully leaving the Metropolitan Police’s 
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decision to permit protestors to leave Parliament Square and enter Whitehall a topic of 
some speculation, which is discussed in depth below. 
 
Conjuring-up the Folk Devil 
It is something of an understatement to note that participant’s accounts of the events in 
Parliament Square on May Day 2000 differ markedly from the mainstream media 
coverage. Reclaim the Streets, who had been participants in the action, commented on 
their website – ‘We’re getting accustomed to being presented with a virtual politics that 
bears no resemblance to the experience of anyone who was there’ 
(http://www.gn.apc.org/rts/mayday 2k/index.htm accessed 18.10.01). Given the spatial 
location of the protest the interpretative stakes were high and require some 
contextualisation. 
 
 Firstly, the tendency of the media and politicians to question the merits of allowing such 
‘protests’ at all conformed with widespread public beliefs that a gathering of this kind 
was legally  permissible. And yet surprisingly, it is worth noting that this event was, in 
fact, always unlawful under the Sectional Order of Parliament, which instructs the 
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police to maintain unimpeded access to the Palace of 
Westminster. Custom and practice thus effectively forbids any protest in an area 
approximately one mile in diameter to the north of the Thames, an area including 
Parliament Square.  
 
Consequently, the massive police operation, unprecedented in thirty years, was as much 
about managing the political theatre of people staking their claim to this piece of land, as 
it was about any objective sense of threat posed by ‘guerrilla gardening’. The police 
found themselves in a double bind, compelled by political imperative to defend a 
particular space, described in police parlance as a ‘ditch’ in which they feel compelled to 
‘die’ (Waddington 1994:66). Guerrilla gardening thus occurred in one of the few places 
that are regarded as absolutely sacrosanct and to be protected no matter what. The 
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prospect of media images portraying  riot-suited officers fighting with ‘gardeners’ 
beneath Big Ben being broadcast around the world from one of the founding seats of 
democracy elevated  the symbolic stakes associated with any confrontation. Allowing the 
crowd into Whitehall and the opportunity to take out their frustrations on a McDonalds 
may therefore count as a carefully choreographed public order strategy, something 
assimilated within activist perceptions of the event. 
As a number of participants observed the crowd was allowed by the police to move up 
Whitehall past an unguarded McDonalds – for many a particularly significant symbol of 
corporate capitalism against which they were protesting. 
‘The inevitable happened and for a full quarter of an hour those who 
wished to had a free hand to smash up the restaurant. It was only when 
surrounding shops were started on that the police miraculously reappeared 
and swiftly and easily corralled everyone in that section of Whitehall into 
the secured pen of Trafalgar Square’.  
(http://www.urban75.org/mayday/015.html accessed 18.10.01). 
 
The eyewitness, quoted above, was suspicious as to why such an event had taken place, 
asking the question ‘Who stood to benefit from the day ending with a small, totally 
contained and 99.9% ineffectual disturbance?’(Ibid). The eyewitness’s conclusion was 
that a kind of ‘give them enough rope and they will hang themselves’ conspiracy had 
taken place, because the police, the politicians and McDonalds would all benefit from 
images of the destruction of yet another McDonalds restaurant. Such a conspiracy, if real, 
would justify the police tactics, allow politicians to ‘rail against those advocating direct 
action’ and give the burger company free publicity.  
 
Although The Evening Standard tabloid newspaper incorrectly reported at the time that 
the McDonalds restaurant had been guarded by ‘12 police officers’ 
(http://www.indymedia.org.uk/newsite/text=softly_policing.txt accessed 18.10.01) John 
Vidal reporting in The Guardian had noted the inevitability of the scenes of destruction – 
‘The confrontation had to happen. The first 400 people went past McDonalds barely 
believing it was there, unboarded and unguarded. The second 300 gathered round it’ 
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(Ibid). The idea that the police would open the stage up to a set piece and stereotypical 
act of destruction of a McDonalds restaurant was further developed in the report of the 
events on the Indymedia web page: 
As everyone knows, McDonalds’ branches under normal circumstances are 
protected by police whenever such a crowd is set to pass by. This isn’t 
particularly heavy-handed or provocative – it’s just what everyone expects, to 
prevent them being attacked. ITN’s late bulletin reported that police had been 
chased away from McDonalds leaving the ‘rioters’ a clear run at their target, 
using police film of fleeing police to back up the narrative. (Ibid) 
 
 
In effect, the Mayday 2000 carnival against capitalism became transformed from a 
‘peaceful celebration of the growing global anti-capitalist movement’6 into a riot. Francis 
Wheen, writing in The Guardian summed up the incredulity of such a label when he 
described the events as being a ‘Small Riot Near Trafalgar Square: No One Dead’ 
(3.05.00). However, as May Day 2001 began to approach the police and politicians were 
keen to rely on the portrayal of the 2000 events as a serious riot to justify the policies and 
tactics employed to deal with the coming event in London. The issuing of public 
warnings of disorder and violence became a feature of the build up to subsequent actions 
organised by anti-globalisation activists in London, Prague and Genoa.  
 
Consolidating the Folk Devil: May Day 2001 
From early 2001, Sir John Stevens - the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police -
launched a police media campaign which portrayed protesters as a dangerous threat to 
society in particularly stark terms. The Sunday Telegraph reported in February 2001 that 
following on from the previous May Day action the 2001 protests would involve: 
… more than 15,000 dedicated, hardened activists from all over Europe 
[who] will descend on just one target, central London.… Among the 
anarchists who are likely to attend are those from the Black Flag 
movement and German terrorists. These are the same people who caused 
trouble at the meeting of the G8 group of economic powers … at 
Seattle…. (18.02.01) 
    
www.internetjournalofcriminology.com  
Internet Journal of Criminology (IJC) © 2004 17
Such accounts were reproduced across the spectrum of mainstream print media 
(see The Observer 29.04.01). Photographs of suspected ringleaders were 
circulated to the press during April 2001 (Vidal and Branigan 2001), despite none 
having been identified as offenders. Rather they were described in newspaper 
reports as people ‘suspected’ by police of ‘intending’ to cause violence. 
Newspaper accounts intoned that anarchists were thousands strong, would carry 
samurai swords, had links with the Real IRA, had been to training camps in USA, 
and were ‘battle hard’ from Seattle.  
 
Whilst the media printed stories condusive to a widespread sense of fear amongst the 
public in relation to the event, and the police mobilised their resources to deal with ‘the 
problem’, politicians were also eager to demonstrate their own condemnation of the new 
deviant group. Ken Livingstone, Mayor of London, warned protesters to stay at home and 
backed the police in arresting anyone whose intention was ‘to engage in criminal 
activities.’ (Vidal and Branigan 2001). 
 
The Guardian, reporting on concern over police and politicians media campaigns against 
the activists, noted that many seasoned campaigners were anxious about the effect of the 
coverage: 
…the past month more than 100 often hysterical articles have been printed 
in the mainstream press hyping the violence, with few suggesting that the 
protesters have any valid point. The unbalance has been remarkable. No 
one wants to look at why people are protesting. (Vidal and Branigan 2001) 
 
The events of May Day 2000 were repeatedly described by politicians, the police and 
media as having been ‘a riot’, something which the facts do not bear out. The media were 
therefore undertaking an exaggeration process. By overstating the violent nature of the 
previous years’ event, the media were also more than willing to predict, that given the 
chance, the protesters would do even more damage the next time around. 
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Arguably, police tactics on May Day 2001 were a deliberate ‘trap’ set for the protesters. 
The police engaged in what they called ‘zero tolerance’ stance, mobilising 6,000 officers 
whilst holding a further 3,000 in reserve (The Independent 2.05.01). Following the 
prominent media statements warning of violence from a hardcore of troublemakers 
within a protest anticipated to be 10,000 strong the actual turn out was estimated at 
between 3000 and 5,000. Many of the most sophisticated street organisers within activist 
circles eschewed the event on the grounds that nothing positive could be achieved in such 
circumstances. Outnumbered, organisers’ plans for a mobile day of mixed carnivalesque 
events, based on the board game Monopoly, ended with protestors surrounded by police 
lines in Oxford Circus.  
 
Known as ‘kettling’, this policing tactic is used widely on mainland Europe and its use in 
London reflected intense collaboration between police and security services. The cordon 
was held for over six hours with those present not being allowed to leave for any reason 
what-so-ever unless they volunteered their names and addresses and consented to having 
a police photograph taken. There were a small number of skirmishes between protesters 
and the police the majority of which resulted from demonstrators’ frustrations at being 
forcibly corralled.  
 
The tabloid media emphasised the success of the police action. The Daily Mail ran under 
a headline reading ‘Day the Law fought back’ (2.05.01) with The Mirror announcing the 
result as if reporting on a football match ‘One Nil To The Bill’ (2.05.01). Both front 
pages carried the same photograph depicting a protester being beaten over the head by a 
police baton. The Sun’s coverage announced ‘Mayhem Across The World – Going Nuts 
in May’ depicting the ‘Face of hate’ as protestors clashed with police in London, 
Australia, France, Korea, Germany, Pakistan and Russia (2.05.01, 12-13). Participants 
were variously described as being a ‘mob’, ‘anarchists’ and ‘thugs’. The broadsheets’ 
carried images of police surrounding protestors in Oxford Circus, with The Daily 
Telegraph headline declaring ‘Police quell May Day threat’ (2.05.01) whilst The Times 
considered: ‘Rain rescues capitalism from spike-haired hoard’ (2.05.01).  The 
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Independent and The Guardian headlines respectively declared ‘Scuffles mar May Day 
protest’& ‘Police set trap for protests’(2.05.01).   
 
 Politicians had sought to declare the stakes in advance with Prime Minister Tony Blair, 
reprising the threat of violence, questioning the legitimacy of protestors concerns and 
upholding the democratic right to peaceful protest:  
The limits are passed when protesters, in the name of some spurious 
cause, seek to inflict fear, terror, violence and criminal damage on people 
and property…. There is a right way to protest in a democracy and there is 
a wrong way. Britain and its people are not just tolerant of peaceful protest 
but see it, rightly, as part of part of our democratic process. (The Guardian 
1.05.01) 
 
On the day itself one of the organisers reportedly addressed the crowd echoing this call 
for peaceful protest whilst making it clear that any attempt at heavy handed policing 
would be met in kind: 
Let me tell the police: we are not here for a violent confrontation. But if 
you fuck with us we will not stand back. We want no trouble or aggression 
but the democratic right to protest peacefully and that is what we are 
going to exercise. (The Guardian, 2.05.01, 4). 
 
Although there was little criticism of the police tactics on the day by mainstream media 
organisations, by mid June the civil rights group Liberty had informed the police that 
they could be sued for ‘unlawfully detaining’ activists in the police cordon on Oxford 
Street (The Guardian 12.06.01). Later the same year The Wombles, part of the tutti 
bianche or white overall movement, subsequently challenged the tactic of kettling more 
directly. Seven wombles were arrested and brought to court where five were released 
after it was ruled that arresting officers had acted unlawfully (The Guardian, 4.05.02, 
13). 
 
However, the police were clearly engaged in what they perceived as a win-win situation 
in their treatment of the protesters. Had violence on the day been extensive, then police 
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warnings to this effect would have been justified. As it was, a relatively peaceful day, 
with the police largely maintaining control arguably demonstrated the wisdom of being 
prepared.  Conversely, it might be argued that the police faced a lose-lose situation: 
having been widely condemned for under-policing May Day 2000 whilst appearing 
heavy handed in 2001. At face value this counter argument has some merit but, as we 
have demonstrated, during the vital high profile post-event coverage such criticism was 
not part of the dominant discourses within print media coverage. Further, it is clear that 
the prior demonization of the protest movement by sections of the press, police and 
politicians meant that the odds were stacked against a policing strategy congruent with 
the carnival atmosphere sought by the organisers despite the Metropolitan Police Force’s 
decades of experience of such policing at the annual Notting Hill Carnival. In 2002 the 
Met’s position remained virtually unchanged with assistant commissioner Mike Todd 
reportedly instructing officers to use ‘in your face’ tactics with protestors regarded as 
potential rioters (Hopkins et.al. 2002).   
 
Within activist circles there is a strong sense of being 'policed out' resulting in residual 
frustrations and the search for further innovations in repertoires of action. The kettling, 
containment and harassment detailed here coincided with anti-terrorism and public order 
legislation which has arguably further eroded rights of assembly and expression in line 
with Tony Blair’s post May Day 2002 statement that: 
 If you have got something to say, say it democratically. Come out and vote, 
but don’t end up trying to beat the place up because your politics aren’t 
shared by the vast majority of people. (Hopkins et.al. 2002).   
Such views resonate with U.S. government thinking which has seen the introduction of  
‘free speech zones’7, specially designated areas, frequently far-removed from the source 
of protestors’ concerns, within which dissent can be voiced.  
‘Feedback’ – Playing the Game in Prague 
In this final section we demonstrate how the construction of anti-globalisation activists as 
folk devils is transmitted across national boundaries producing interesting modalities 
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arising from the interaction of various national policing and protest cultures. Following 
May Day 2000 the IMF / WB summit to be held in Prague on September 26th was widely 
seen as a significant event in terms of such protests. Preparations for the event included 
detailed briefings of the Czech police and security forces by the deputy director of the 
FBI Thomas Packard (Pravo 29.08.00 p.2) and European security services. Given the 
Czech Republics recent emergence as a ‘democracy’ there was little experience of 
policing civil demonstrations and significant know how and equipment specifications 
were imparted in this process to the satisfaction of US agencies (Lidove noviny 31.08.00, 
p.2). Lidove noviny also reported the operations of ‘radicals from the USA’ and ‘west 
European countries’ who were ‘training their Czech colleagues’ (Ibid) for an event 
characterised by the headline ‘Police and demonstrators are preparing for a “war” (Lidove 
noviny 21.09.00, p.2). A number of interviewees reported that the citizens of Prague were 
advised to leave the city with schools being closed to facilitate this. On the day there was 
an overwhelming display of force from the Czech police that included blocking the route 
of the main march towards the conference centre with two Armoured Personnel Carriers 
and a number of rows of riot police kitted out in full Kevlar body-armour.  
 
Despite the demonization of activists the Prague event reveals that the targets of the folk 
devil construct are not without power however, having an ability to appropriate and 
subvert the discourses of marginalisation. This is a significant shift from traditional 
accounts of the folk devil. For example, during the protests, we find groups such as the 
Italian social activists ‘Ya Basta!’8 elaborating the outlaw theme and embracing their role 
as ‘outsiders’. Using their understanding of the dynamics between media, police and 
activists, Ya Basta! provided a form of ‘feedback’ – a distorted amplification of the folk 
devil image that sought to re-orient the debate about criminality and civil disobedience. 
Ya Basta! embraced the outsider motif and used it to their own advantage in their 
literature and in the development of their activism - thus at the Prague protests they 
claimed that they would ‘liquidate’ the International Monetary Fund. This ‘liquidation’ 
was not about using violence but using water pistols and water bombs instead: 
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We are criminal, delinquents, and outlaws: using our weapons we shall take what 
is ours. And if the booty we are after is a universal citizens’ income, where should 
we strike, if not at a meeting of the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund? And if we want to liquidate them, what better weapons than water filled 
weapons?9  
 
The confrontation between the white overalls of Ya Basta! and the black riot uniforms of 
the police conjured up the classic binary opposition of  black/white that has symbolically 
denotes good and evil. News footage of this clash was difficult to ‘consume’ in the same 
way as images of violence featuring protestors in black balaclavas. This interaction 
required explanation and some measure of the appropriateness of the state response, the 
joke here appeared to be on the police.  
 
This style of protest presented a challenge to dominant media representations of the anti-
capitalist protesters. Unable to place them easily into the violent category, sections of the 
British press described their actions as a ‘surreal’ battle in which ‘Ya Basta threw 
coloured balloons at the police, who popped them’ (The Independent 27.09.00, p.2). To 
the Czech press however, Ya Basta! represented an Italian ‘hard left’ faction intent on 
destruction (Pravo 27.09.00, p.2).    Ya Basta!’s ability to re-orient the framing of the 
interaction between police and protesters was clearly mediated by reportage categories 
prioritised by different elements of the media. Irrespective of this, Ya Basta!s 
‘presentation of self’ demonstrates the reflexive capacities developed within global  
movements based on direct communication, dedicated movement media channels which 
render tangible the diverse constituencies present within such events (Chesters and 
Welsh, 2004, 2005).  
 
Prague empirically demonstrated this diversity, further illustrating the point that mass 
gatherings are not homogeneous ‘mobs’, by staging three colour coded marches, pink, 
blue and yellow, with each colour symbolically denoting a particular orientation towards 
the event.  The avowedly carnivalesque ‘pink’ march (see Chesters and Welsh 2004) 
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navigated through the streets probing weak points in the police fortifications of the 
conference centre. ‘Pink’ coalesced from elements of the British direct action scene, 
including Earth First! (Wall 1999) and Reclaim the Streets central to events in London.  
Their commitment to forms of carnival as street protest originated in activists desire to 
confuse and disturb the familiar drama of police/protester relations that was seen to be 
increasingly ritualised, violent and inhibiting. In Prague, street tactics included a simple 
navigation system using bicycle outriders to reconnoitre the immediate route and to 
report back upon the possibilities for movement and action, which were then decided 
upon through consensus processes. To key Czech observers’ the ensuing pattern of 
movement appeared chaotic and incoherent ‘because they didn't have any Czechs with 
them’ (Interview 12.09.01). Far from being chaotic the movements were systemic and 
achieved the objective of gaining access to the conference enclave by exploiting 
weaknesses in police lines. 
 
As we have shown the same simplifying themes of violence and the mob were widely 
reproduced within the Czech print media. As a former Czech dissident colleague of 
President Vaclav Havel commented, despite his best attempts to achieve a ‘win – win’ 
outcome for the Prague event: 
Czech media failed in informing the public um … I mean, you know at the 
end I think it was 26 shop windows broken. The next morning all major 
dailies used the word “war” in the uh . .  headlines on the front pages so hell 
for Czech’s 26 shop windows equals war. Um ... this was revolting. 
(Interview 12.09.01) 
One report reproduced police estimates that 80% of participants had been 
‘aggressive persons willing to provoke clashes with police and destroy property’ 
detailing almost 900 arrests, criminal charges against 18 ‘foreigners’ and 2 Czech 
nationals, 142 injured demonstrators, 123 injured police and damage estimated at 
CZK 20m  (Lidove noviny, 29.09.00, p.1).   
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Against such simplification, central to the construction of a folk devil lies a range of 
complex interactions reflecting the diverse, purposive, expressive and reflexive activities 
of a movement that cannot be simply reduced to violence and the mob. The means by 
which Ya Basta! regained some control over their image and challenged the media 
portrayal of activists and the mobile reflexivity of the ‘Pink’ march suggests that there 
are significant differences between the anti-globalisation movement and the traditional 
national folk devil. 
 
Historically, many activists have had the sophistication to challenge their demonization 
but their means of communication have remained confined to limited circles insufficient 
to counteract mainstream press representations. Now, within the contemporary milieu, 
the Internet offers a significant tool that allows activists the opportunity to take some 
control over the way news is reported (Pickerill, 2003) and becomes a key resource for 
mainstream media commentators. Groups such as Indymedia (Atton, 2003), 
Undercurrents, and journals such as UK based Do or Die (Atton 2002), all provide an 
alternative view of the public and political sphere. Although large sections of the public 
may not directly hear these alternative voices, it remains the case that, moral panic or not, 
this group of folk devils is very unlikely to be a silent and passive target of vilification 
and marginalisation.  
 
Conclusions 
In this paper we have traced attempts to construct anti-capitalist protestors and their 
actions in a manner consistent with the treatment of folk devils as initially defined by 
Cohen (1972). Whilst Cohen’s emphasis on the media practices of exaggeration, 
prediction and symbolisation are clearly present in relation to each of the events detailed 
here we have argued that this is in effect a ‘new’ and problematic type of folk devil.   
 
Traditional folk devils become powerfully associated with a moral panic through the 
attachment of simplifying deviance frames and the ensuing public engagement with the 
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threat to established order via expert interpretation. We would suggest that there is an 
absence of such associated crisis in the case of the anti-capitalist movement which 
requires analysis and explanation. There is little evidence of the accompanying moral 
outrage from the familiar source of expert commentators such as academics and religious 
leaders. In our introductory section we noted the extension of terrorist tropes to an 
increasingly wide range of environmental and social justice actors prior to events of 9/11 
and the subsequent ‘war’ on terrorism. Given the degree of overlapping membership 
between anti-capitalist and anti-war movements, the endorsement of anti-war stances by 
‘experts’ such as the Arch Bishop of Canterbury reflects a wider social ambiguity over 
the stakes articulated by such activism. The distance between public and activists 
orientations towards protest activities asserted by Tony Blair, in the wake of May Day 
events in London, is far less clear cut than his formulation suggests.  
 
In the aftermath of May Day 2000, speculation within movement circles focussed upon 
whether London EF! And RTS would ever have the credibility to mount a major event 
ever again. Whilst activists were questioning their continued viability in the face of the 
barrage of media condemnation public attitudes were somewhat less clear cut. A 
Democratic Audit survey (http://www.fhit.org.democratic_audit) sought responses to the 
statement ‘If governments don’t listen, peaceful protests, blockades and demonstrations 
are legitimate ways of expressing people’s concerns’. Amongst respondents 49% agreed 
strongly whilst a further 32% tended to agree a combined total of 81%.  Such polling 
evidence leaves interpretation of ‘peaceful’ open but taken with other indicators, such as 
not guilty jury verdicts in trials involving activists from Trident Ploughshares charged 
with criminal damage on military bases, point to a public sphere which resonates with 
aspects of the anti-capitalist movements’ case and moral principles.  
 
Such public ambivalence is key in understanding the importance of the silencing process 
we have argued is central in the construction of this new folk devil. If a debate is opened 
up about the underlying moral and ideological elements that might explain the actions of 
the activists this would require an exploration of some of the very issues which they are 
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trying to draw public attention to. In order to maintain the silencing process, there needs 
to be no accompanying debate about the activists beyond their deviancy and naïveté. 
 
Compared to traditional ‘folk devils’ as outsiders the new use of the folk devil category 
does not fall so clearly into the outsider/insider approach. The development of anti-
capitalist activists as a category of folk devil serves a number of aims. The activist as 
demon may offer a way for the established system to re-entrench the dominance of the 
primary political, constitutional and economic system, something understood by the 
traditional account. However, the political dynamic between the established system and 
the ideological challenge from outside is more complex than this anxiety theory approach 
suggests. Anti-capitalist activists represent a systemic challenge to the established system 
compared to traditional folk devils.  
 
‘Normal’ folk devils are marginalized by their pre-existing marginal position in society 
and are therefore an easy and often convenient target. On the other hand, anti-capitalist 
activists are marginalized for their very dangerousness and their self-identification. They 
do not start out silent within civil society; they do have a voice, albeit a voice from the 
political outside. Thus, one of the hoped for effects of the construction of activists as folk 
devils is to silence voices of opposition to the system. This is important because it re-
affirms Melucci’s (1996) argument that most political discourse seeks to deny the 
existence of fundamental conflicts about the production and appropriation of social 
resources by reducing everything to a question of grievances or political claims. Finally, 
the demonization of activists militates against large sections of society identifying with 
their actions. By removing the identity of the individuals and focussing on the group as 
‘anarchists’ and ‘thugs’ they become associated with the violence that the media chooses 
to focus upon, not the message their activism seeks to advance.  
 
The development of a new type of folk devil in the form of the anti-capitalist activist, 
therefore, offers some new challenges for our understanding of the construction of 
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deviancy. Although there are similarities with the more traditional approach, the effects 
of creating this new folk devil are more complex and multi-faceted than the usual results 
of moral panics. The degree of reflexivity demonstrated by activists and movements and 
the accompanying desire to subvert established encounters with the police have already 
catalysed hybrid repertoires of protest that seek to exploit the possibilities of ‘re-framing’ 
how these events are communicated (Welsh and Chesters, 2001). The addition of the 
social forum movement (Sen et. al., 2004) to the anti-capitalist movements repertoires 
represents a further strengthening of the proactive elements of these movements making 
it increasingly difficult to present these protests as solely the product of a new ‘folk-
devil’.  
 
One possible outcome is that politicians will seek the social-democratic assimilation of 
these movements through some new political settlement. It seems more likely that the 
criminal justice systems will be left to ‘police the new crisis of interest representation’ in 
democracies confronted by the pressures of neo-liberal globalisation. In the UK, New 
Labour is reported to have created more than 600 new criminal offences since 1997 
(Kettle 2004) whilst media reportage on terrorism since 9/11 has proliferated despite 
there being fewer actual terrorist events per year since 2001 (Lewis 2004).  It would 
appear that the extension of terrorist tropes to more and more, far from marginal social 
locations, is set to construct more rebels with a cause who will appear within the criminal 
justice system leaving judges and juries confronted with the task of reconciling 
underlying motivations, ‘deviant’ behaviour and what constitutes legitimate forms of 
protest.     
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person’s life … (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public … or (e) is designed seriously 
to interfere with or seriously disrupt an electronic system’ where such actions are under S1(b) ‘designed to 
influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public’, and (c) ‘the use or threat is 
made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.’ 
 
5 Jack Straw also sought to shift some blame for damage to public memorials onto English Heritage and the 
Royal Parks Agency for not having them boarded up prior to the event. 
 
6 Reclaim the Streets leaflet Guerrilla Gardening 2000 
 
7 The irony of this Orwellian term was not lost on Congressman Barney Frank who commented: ‘As we 
read the First Amendment to the Constitution, the United States is a “free speech zone!”’ – 
www.house.gov/frank/scprotester2003.html 
 
8 ‘Ya Basta’ (Enough!) and the closely affiliated ‘Tute Bianche’ (White Overalls) have been highly visible 
at anti-capitalist actions throughout Europe, latterly metamorphosising in to the broader ‘disobbedienti’ 
network (the disobedients) They regularly caught the media’s attention because of the theatrical element to 
their protest - they dressed in white with many wearing padding made of foam rubber and cardboard to 
demonstrate their need to be protected from police assault. Their presence provided a strong visual effect  
which was actively coupled with humour to undermine and deconstruct the expected dynamics of protest 
and political engagement through civil disobedience. This style has since been copied throughout Europe 
including the Wombles at the London May Day 2001 action. 
9 Ya Basta! Agit-prop. 
 
 
